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The aim of this study was to explore the relationship between corporate governance and the 
financial soundness of the licensed deposit taking SACCOs in Kenya. The study specifically 
examined how boards’ responsibility, transparency and disclosure and internal controls 
influence the financial soundness of licensed deposit taking SACCOs in Kenya. Financial 
soundness was measured using PEARLS monitoring systems. A questionnaire was 
administered to the CEOs and senior management officers of the SACCOs. These subjects 
were deemed conversant with the issues of corporate governance in their respective 
SACCOs. Regression analysis was used to establish the relationship of corporate governance 
on the financial soundness of the SACCOs. 
The study found out that internal controls played a significant role in corporate governance. 
Three variables namely; board responsibility, transparency and disclosure and internal 
controls were found to be key factors in financial soundness of the SACCOs. However in 
ranking according to their role in financial soundness of SACCOs, board responsibility was 
considered the least. Regression analysis showed that when protection and rates of return 
coefficients were used as a measure of financial soundness; board responsibility, transparency 
and internal controls did not explain the variation individually. When the effective financial 
structure and liquidity coefficients were used, the three independent variables explained the 
variation. Multiple regressions showed that the variations in the financial soundness were 
explained by the three independent variables. 
The study concludes that CEOs and seniors officers can also measure the importance of 
financial soundness using PEARLS since it evaluates and monitors the SACCOs financial 
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CHAPTER ONE:  INTRODUCTION 
 
Savings and Credit Co-operative Societies (SACCOs) are usually established in Kenya with firm 
bases of small savings accounts thus creating a stable and relatively low-cost source of funding 
and low administrative costs (Branch, 2005).  Moreover, SACCOs in Kenya have been in a 
position to issue loans to their members at interest rates lower than those required by other 
established financial institutions such as banks. In addition, these SACCOs also have the ability 
to reach their customers in places that are unattractive to banks, such as the less financially 
endowed upcountry areas. Consequently, the SACCOs have an upper edge over their competitors 
in relation to customer base. One of the key objectives of the SACCOs is to empower members 
through encouraging savings and releasing credit to clients (Ofei, 2001). SACCOs have been 
successful in achieving this objective. In Kenya, the SACCOs have managed to generate over 
Kshs.200 billion in savings, contributing to over 30% to gross domestic saving (Co-operative 
Bank of Kenya, 2010). 
1.1 Background of the study 
Governance is concerned with structures and processes for decision making, accountability, 
control and behavior at the top of organizations (Brownbridge, 2007). In addition, corporate 
governance is a concept that involves practices that entail the organization of management and 
control of companies. Corporate governance is considered the means by which an organization is 
directed and controlled. In wider terms according to Brownbridge, corporate governance refers to 
the processes by which organizations are directed, controlled and held accountable. Governance 
therefore entails authority, accountability, stewardship, leadership, direction and control 
exercised in corporations. Governance reflects the interaction among those persons and groups, 
which provide resources to the company and contribute to its performance such as shareholders, 
employees, creditors, long-term suppliers and subcontractors (Brownbridge, 2007). 
Corporate governance contributes in developing the relationship between the organization and its 
general environment, the social and political systems in which it operates. Corporate governance 
interlinks with the organizations’ economic performance and further determines the conditions 
for access to capital markets and investor confidence (Brownbridge, 2007). 
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Governance is the set of processes, customs, policies, laws and institutions affecting the way a 
corporation is directed, administered or controlled (Knell, 2006). Corporate governance therefore 
includes the relationships among the many players involved (the stakeholders) and the goals for 
which the institutions are governed. The principal players are the shareholders (members), 
management and the board of directors. Other stakeholders include employees, suppliers, 
customers, bankers and other lenders, regulators, the environment and the community at large 
(Knell, 2006). 
Many problems in different co-operatives societies across Europe like mismanagement, financial 
scandals and failure of democracy lead to the questioning of the quality of corporate governance 
(Lees 1995; Lee and Volkers 1996). Therefore, concerns like these have led to renewed 
professional and academic interest in corporate governance. 
Improvements in the management and administration of many organizations are essential if the 
global efforts to halt corruption and other types of irregularity are to achieve desired results. An 
appropriate legal framework is necessary to define the roles of governing bodies, and chief 
executives and the related framework of authorities and responsibilities of each level of 
corporate governance. For instance, before and after the Asian financial crisis in 1997, firms that 
were practicing corporate governance fared better and provided higher protection to the 
shareholders (Joh 2003;Mitton 2002). 
1.1.1. Pillars of corporate governance  
In this study the pillars of corporate governance covered include board, transparency and 
disclosure and internal controls. Board of directors who hold office are supposed to be competent 
individuals who are able to add value in decision making process (CBK, 2001).Board of 
directors should ensure the survivability of corporations by setting strategies and standards that 
protect organizations assets .Transparency is a system of checks and balances between the 
stakeholders (Bhasin,2009). Disclosure on the other hand consists of all forms of voluntary 
corporate communications (Healy and Palepu, 2001). Internal controls ensure that appropriate 
financial, operational and compliance systems are there (Sulaiman, 2003).Inadequate controls 




1.1.2. Financial performance of  DT SACCOs 
The financial performance of licensed DT SACCOs has been improving year by year. In the year 
2013 total assets increased by 16.6 percent from Kenya shillings 207.3 billion in December 2012 
to Kenya shillings 241.6 billion in December 2013. Turnover increased by 32.1 percent from 
Kenya shillings 28.4 billion of year 2012 to Kenya shilling 33.7 billion in 2013 (SACCO 
Supervision Annual Report 2013). 
A number of studies that have examined the relationship between corporate governance and the 
operations of the firm show that good governance practices increase the economic value of the 
firm, as well as higher productivity and lower systematic risk (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997; John 
and Senbet, 1998 and Hermalin and Weisbach, 1991). Brown & Caylor (2009) analyzed US 
firms and their findings indicate that better governed firms are relatively more profitable, more 
valuable and pay more cash to their shareholders as good governance was associated with the 
firm performance. 
1.1.3. Corporate governance  
Corporate governance protects a firm from vulnerability to future financial distress (Bhagat and 
Jefferis, 2002). Firms have ability to react to external factors that have some effects on its 
financial soundness due to the governance structure of the entity (Donaldson, 2003). Therefore 
better governed organizations do well since good corporate governance is of importance to 
organization’s operation and hence an increase in firm’s financial sustainability (Demsetz 
&Villalonga, 2002). A well-functioning corporate governance system helps a firm to attract 
investment, raise funds and strengthen the foundation for firm operations (Demsetz &Villalonga, 
2002).That a well-functioning governance system is of importance in growth of the firm’s 
finances. This means that implementation and enforcement of proper corporate governance 
practices is vital for enhancing the development of firms and their long-term prosperity (Khiari, 
Karaa, and Omri, 2007). 
For developing countries, significant benefits can be linked to higher corporate governance 
standards in the private sector. These include better access to external finance, lower costs of 
capital and better firm performance (Claessens 2003).The argument is that poor corporate 
governance weakens firm financial soundness, and is the primary cause of   financial crises such 
as the 1997 East Asia crisis. It therefore retards growth of the firm. Other studies show that good 
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corporate governance is of essence for improving investor motivation and market liquidity 
(Donaldson, 2003). Parker (2007), theory of the separation of ownership and management’s 
domination, argued that agency problem occurs when the principal have inadequate power to 
monitor and control the agent and when the compensation of the principal and the agent is not 
considered. 
Key elements of good corporate governance principles include honesty, trust and integrity, 
openness, performance orientation, responsibility and accountability, mutual respect, and 
commitment to the organization (Private sector governance trust Kenya, 1999). Corporate 
governance principles are designed as a basis to help each company formulates their individual 
codes of best practice (Private sector governance trust Kenya, 1999). The following is a 
summary of the principles of good corporate governance as per private sector corporate 
governance trust Kenya (1999) and the Capital Market Act (CAP.485A) 2002: 
Authority and duties of members or shareholders:  Members as owners of the organizations 
jointly and severally protect, preserve and actively exercise the supreme authority of the 
corporation in general meetings. Members of the entity ensure that only competent and reliable 
persons, who can add value, are elected or appointed to the board of directors and ensure that the 
board is constantly held accountable and responsible for the efficient and effective governance of 
the corporation so as to achieve corporate objectives, prosperity and sustainability (PSGT,1999). 
Board:  Each organization should be guided by an efficient board that should exercise leadership, 
enterprise, integrity and judgment in facilitating the corporation so as to achieve future prosperity 
and to act in the best interest of the enterprise in a manner based on transparency, accountability 
and responsibility (Kariuki et al.). Selecting the board of directors should be through a proper 
managed process and ensure that a balanced mixture of proficient individuals is made and that 
each of those appointed is able to add value and bring independent judgment to bear on the 
decision-making process (PSGT, 1999). 
 
Strategy and Values: The purpose and values of the organizations should be determined by the 
board of directors (PSGT, 1999). 
 
Structure and Organization: Management structure organization, systems and people are  put in 
place by the board so that the organization keeps integrity, reputation, and responsibility (PSGT, 
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1999).This assist to put strong internal controls to safeguard the financial soundness of the 
organization. 
 
Corporate performance, viability and financial sustainability:  Monitoring and assessing the 
implementation of strategies, policies and performance in organization is the work of the board. 
Besides, reviewing the financial viability and sustainability constantly and regularly should be 
done by the board (PSGT, 1999).This enhances the transparency of organization and increases 
the participation of the stakeholder strengthening the financial soundness of organization. 
 
Corporate Compliance: All relevant laws, regulations, governance practices, accounting and 
auditing standards should be complied with and ascertained by the board (PSGT, 1999).This is 
the Board responsibility to ensure all regulatory requirements are achieved. 
Integrity and ethical behavior: This is important for public relations, risk management and 
avoiding lawsuits. A code of conduct that promotes ethical and reasonable decision making for 
directors and executives should be developed by organizations (PSGT, 1999).  This improves the 
transparency and disclosure which increases investment and thus improving the financial 
soundness of the organization. 
 
Disclosure and transparency: The responsibilities and duties of board and top management need 
to be disclosed to the stakeholders in order to provide accountability to the organization. 
Procedures have to be implemented to independently review and protect the integrity of the 
firm’s financial reporting. Disclosure of financial and other relevant matters of the organization 
should be timely and balanced to ensure that all investors have access to clear, factual 
information (PSGT, 1999).  Disclosure and transparency improves the image of organization and 
reduces risk to the stakeholders hence improves the financial soundness of the organizations. 
1.1.4. Savings and credit co-operatives 
Ghana had the first SACCO Society in Africa in 1959 (Ng'ombe & Mikwamba, 2004). This 
SACCO was founded with an aim of assisting villagers in improving their economic conditions 
(Ng'ombe & Mikwamba, 2004).The idea of the  SACCOs were first adopted by the English 
speaking nations of Africa with the first entrants into SACCO community included: Ghana, 
Uganda, Nigeria, Tanzania, and Kenya. Most of the Non-English speaking nations in Africa 
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started appreciating SACCOs in 1960s, with major influx into the SACCO community in the 
1970s (Mwakajumilo, 2011). 
The formation of the SACCOs in Africa grew tremendously to the extent that the African 
countries formed a continental association of SACCOs, Africa confederation of cooperative 
society savings and credit association (ACCOSSCA) in 1965. The ACCOSSCA was formed 
with the principal objective of promoting the SACCO principles, offer SACCOs insurance, and 
educate members on SACCOs issues (Ng'ombe and Mikwamba, 2004).  
 The first Co-operative society in Kenya was formed in 1908. It was called Lumbwa co-operative 
society and was for the European farmers. The key objective of this society was to support 
activities involving agriculture and farming products and to take advantage of producing less 
costly (Kenya Union of Saving and Credit Co-operatives [KUSCCO], 2006). 
The Government of Kenya (GOK) controlled the co-operatives through the co-operative 
Ordinance Act passed in 1945. An amendment of the act was done in 1997 decentralizing 
government control and giving it to the commissioner of co-operatives under the co-operative 
Societies Act 1997. This Act was formed to put a policy guideline for co-operative development 
in Kenya .This therefore, removed co-operatives from the control of the Government by assisting 
withdrawal of state control over the co-operative movement. The idea behind this was to ensure 
co-operatives were independent, self-reliable, autonomous controlled and economically viable 
institutions. The role of the government became that of regulating and facilitating co-operatives 
autonomy. This ensured the co-operatives competed with other private enterprises in the 
marketing of agricultural produce (Republic of Kenya, 1997Act). In 2004 an amendment to the 
1997 Act was made. This amendment strengthened state regulation of the co-operative 
movements through the office of the Commissioner for Co-operative Development. 
In 2008 the SACCO societies Act was passed to assist in licensing, regulating, super visioning 
and promotion of savings and credit co-operatives by the SACCO society regulatory authority. 
Through this Act, the SACCO society regulatory authority (SASRA) was established. Its 
functions include permitting SACCOs to carry out deposit – taking business, regulating and 
supervising SACCOs (Republic of Kenya, 2008b) (Wanyama, 2009). 
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1.1.5. Deposit taking SACCOs 
The two major categories of co-operatives in Kenya include financial co-operatives (Savings & 
credit co-operative societies- SACCOs) and non-financial co-operatives (includes farm produce 
and other commodities marketing co-operatives, housing, transport and investment co-
operatives). SACCOs have experienced quick growth than other co-operatives in the recent past 
(SACCO Supervision Annual report, 2010). The SACCO society Act 2008 was created so that 
the licensing, supervision and regulation of deposit taking should be under the SACCO society 
regulatory authority (SASRA). Due to this new legal framework, important regulations have 
been established to guide SACCO’s growth and development. 
 
The Kenya SACCO sub sector comprises both deposit taking and non-deposit taking SACCOs. 
The deposit taking SACCOs (DT SACCOs) are licensed and regulated by SACCO society 
regulatory authority (SASRA) while non-deposit taking SACCOs is supervised by the 
commissioner for co-operatives. SASRA licenses SACCOs that have been duly registered under 
the cooperative societies Act CAP 490. 
 In the year 2013 the licensed DT SACCOs gained in performance with total assets increasing by 
16.6 percent from Kenya shillings207.3 billion in December 2012 to Kenya shillings 241.6 
billion in December 2013.This increase was contributed by member’s deposits, share capital and 
retained earnings. Turnover grew to Kenya shillings 33.7 billion compared to Kenya shillings 
28.4 billion of 2012 an increase of 32.1 percent (SACCO Supervision Annual Report 2013). 
 
As at 31st December 2013, the total number of DT SACCOs was 215, of which 135 of them had 
been licensed (SACCO Supervision Annual Report 2013). The remaining 80 SACCOs were at 
different levels of compliance with the provisions of the law. The DT SACCOs are spread across 
the Counties and are categorized as follows: Teacher based 45, Government 41, Farmers 73, 
Private institutions 24, and Community based SACCOs 32 (SACCO Supervision Annual Report 
2012). All these DT SACCOs were in operation prior to establishment of SASRA in 2009 and 
have applied to be considered for licensing as undertaking DT SACCO business (SACCO 




SASRA adopted CAMEL method to assess financial soundness of deposit taking SACCOs in 
Kenya just like the other financial institutions (SASRA, 2012). However, majority of other 
SACCOs and credit unions in other countries use PEARLS method. The Capital adequacy, Asset 
quality, Management, Earnings and Liquidity (CAMEL) rating system is based upon an 
evaluation of five critical elements of SACCOs operations: Capital Adequacy, Asset Quality, 
Management, Earnings and Liquidity. This rating system is designed to take into account and 
reflect all significant financial and operational factors that assess evaluation of SACCOs 
financial soundness. 
 
Protection ,Effective financial structure, Asset quality, Rates of return, and cost , Liquidity and 
Signs of growth (PEARLS) system was developed by the World Council of Credit Unions to 
monitor the financial stability of credit unions and serve as an early warning system for 
management decision – making (Credit Management, 2002). PEARLS system was designed to 
go beyond the identification issue, helping managers to find vital solutions to solve institutional 
problems. The PEARLS system can identify if a credit union is based on weak capital and 
indicate the causes of such weakness. The system also creates a universal financial language to 
evaluate credit unions worldwide with an easy-access language that can improve the 
communication and information uniformity (Richardson, 2002). 
1.1.6. Effects of Corporate governance on SACCOs 
 Most of the problems bedeviling SACCOs arise from bad governance and poor economic 
management (Wanyama 2009).Wanyama goes on to state that the directors of SACCOs direct 
and control the organizations, and managers run them. Members of the SACCOs have the right 
to demand and enforce good governance in their organizations by electing directors and 
attending annual general meeting (AGM). At the same time Wanyama emphasizes that corporate 
governance principles seek to ensure that directors act in the best interest of the organization that 
they lead in order to achieve the objectives for which was founded.  If SACCOs are to remain 
commercially viable and sustainable enterprises for socio-economic development, they must 
embrace good governance (Wanyama 2009).  
 
As Kenyan SACCO sub-sector continues its growth trajectory it needs to embrace the new 
regulatory framework that promotes transparency, accountability and good governance practices. 
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The SACCO board of directors is charged with the responsibility of ensuring sound and prudent 
management of SACCO affairs through the implementation of a sound and effective policy 
framework. This however, has been noted to lack in the majority of SACCOs. It is the view of 
the authority that SACCOs need to improve on the governance front to ensure SACCOs realize 
their potential (SACCO Supervision Annual Report 2012). 
 
Key challenges in the growth of SACCOs are to establish proper governance systems. The long 
term survival and good performance of SACCOs can be attributed to good governance. 
Governance is regarded as one of the weakest areas in SACCOs and therefore has become of 
increasing interest. The high growth in service providers, several institutional and legal changes, 
and changes of institutions and the behavior of public authorities towards SACCOs are some of 
the reasons for governance to be of a major concern in the SACCO debate (Odera, 2012). 
The SACCO crisis in Benin, Morocco and Kenya in the year 2010 suggests the rationale of 
having control in institutional development. Due to their many objectives, SACCOs are 
considered to differ in organizational forms, products, methodologies, social ranking, and profit 
seeking attitude (Odera, 2012). 
One of the core sources of financing economy of recent years in developing countries is from the 
SACCOs. This has made SACCOs to grow rapidly and their importance being considered highly 
by academics as are also importantly contributing a major role in today’s microfinance market 
(Odera, 2012). 
1.2. Statement of the Problem 
SACCOs management challenges include poor corporate governance and lack of members’ 
confidence (Ademba, 2010). According to Ndung’u (2010), SACCOs suffer from 
mismanagement and poor investments. Despite the seemingly tight regulatory framework being 
put in place by SASRA, corporate governance is still weak in Kenya (Mang’unyi, 2011). A study 
by (Chavez, 2006) found that the financial performance of the SACCO sector is very weak and 
spread weakness to other areas, like governance, fiscal discipline, financial, operational, internal 
controls, and the risk management involved in running a financial institution.  Previous studies 
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(Agrawal et al, 2007; Adeyemo and Bamire,2005; Deji ,2005; Asher ,2007) have shown that lack 
of growth of SACCOs wealth do threaten their sustainability due to poor corporate governance.  
According to Brasilia (2008), the use of good practices of corporate governance has proved to be 
the basic in the success and continuity of co-operatives, mainly in what regards security and 
returns to members in the developing world. A well-developed system of corporate governance 
yields more transparent relations, reducing several risks and improving security in all co-
operatives of the system (Brasilia,2008). Good corporate governance can improve the 
performance of a SACCO and help assure its long term survival (Thomsen, 2008). According to 
(Mpiira, et al., 2013) members will not join SACCO where there is no viable economic 
enterprise that would generate them income and where corporate governance is weak. 
Why this study is important is that DT SACCOs have three quarters of the SACCO subsector’s 
assets, deposits and membership (SASRA, 2013). Deposit taking SACCOs help in savings 
mobilization; they present a substantial element of the financial system; and provide essential 
services to a large number of low income household in Kenya. Corporate governance in these 
SACCOs, if well managed, promises better future performance (SACCO Supervision Annual 
Report 2013).  
Thus, from the above we can see that some of the studies suggest positive and significant 
relationship between corporate governance and financial soundness; while some studies suggest 
no significant association between corporate governance and financial soundness. Thus, the 
existing studies provide mixed and inconclusive results. Therefore, arising from these 
controversies, the study seek to examine the relationship between the key pillars of corporate 
governance and financial soundness of the licensed deposit taking SACCOs in Kenya.  
1.3. Objective of the Study 
The main objective of the research project was to examine the relationship between corporate 
governance and financial soundness of the licensed deposit taking SACCOs in Kenya. 
The specific objectives of the study are: 




2. To assess the relationship between corporate governance and financial soundness of the 
licensed deposit taking SACCOs in Kenya. 
1.4. Research Questions 
This study seeks to answer the following questions: 
1. What is the status of the pillars of corporate governance in licensed deposit taking SACCOs in 
Kenya? 
2. What is the relationship between the corporate governance and financial soundness of the 
licensed deposit taking SACCOs in Kenya? 
1.5. Significance of the Study 
Findings of this research will be important to the management of the SACCOs; who will 
understand how various aspects of corporate governance affect SACCOs operations. The 
management will also be able to identify the constraints that SACCOs face in approaching 
various corporate governance that affect financial management. The findings of this study will 
also enhance the efforts of government regulators in coming up with regulations that will govern 
the operations of the SACCOs. The study will contribute to the achievement of the government’s 
policy of prosperity for all through sensitizing the members and non- members on how to benefit 
from properly run SACCOs and mobilizing citizens to save through SACCOs. The research will 
be of importance to the SACCOs members as they will be able to ascertain the strength of their 
SACCOs, gain confidence on the well performing ones and be able to question the poorly 
performing ones. This will encourage more saving and investments in SACCOs and hence an 
increase in SACCOs assets. 
1.6. Scope of the study 
The study focused on licensed deposit taking SACCO in Nairobi. As at June 2014 there were 
estimated 43 licensed deposit taking SACCO in Nairobi. The study covered a period of 4 years 
from year 2010 to 2013.The primary data were collected from 43 SACCOs and secondary data 
from 13 audited SACCOs. We analyzed 13 audited SACCOs since they were the only ones 
available for the four years under study. 
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CHAPTER TWO – LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.1. Introduction 
This chapter explicates the factors and principles influencing corporate governance and theories 
supporting corporate governance. It reviews prior studies on the relationship between corporate 
governance and the firm. The chapter justifies the selection of the elements of corporate 
governance necessary for good governance. It explains the concept of financial soundness. 
2.2. Theoretical Review  
Several theories can be used to explain the need for good corporate governance (Salleh & Mallin, 
2002; Leng, 2004; Seifert, Gonenc & Wright, 2005). Donaldson and Preston (1995) advocate the 
use of stakeholder theory to explain why good corporate governance is necessary for the success 
of an entity. On the other hand Davis et al. (1997) claim that firm performance is directly related 
to shareholders’ wealth maximization and stewardship protection. Abdullah and Valentine 
(2009) bring in Agency Theory as the relationship between the principal and the agent of the 
firm.  
 
In a SACCO, individuals become members by contributing their money to the SACCO, either in 
the form of capital or deposits. Hence, the ownership of a SACCO resides with the members in a 
SACCO; they are the principals. They appoint managers, their agents, to carry out the day-to-day 
running of the SACCO. Agency Theory points out that the agents will act opportunistically to 
their own advantage. Anecdotal evidence states that the majority of SACCO managers do act for 
their own benefit, rather than for the benefit of the members of the SACCO. Hence, agency 
theory is appropriate to explain the need for controls to be put in place to achieve good 
governance. In addition, stakeholder and stewardship theories do so as well. 
The Resource dependency and Managerial hegemony theories can also be used to explain the 
need for good governance; but they do not have the same explanatory power as the three theories 





2.2.1. Agency theory 
 Abdullah & Valentine (2009) state that Agency Theory explains the relationship between 
principals and their agents. Members, the owners or principals of the SACCOs, elect the 
management board as their agents (Alchian & Demsetz, 1972; Jensen & Meckling, 1976; 
Mitnick, 2006; Bruton et al., 2000), who in turn hire and delegate authority to the managers 
(Clarke, 2004). Daily et al. (2003) note that two factors influence the prominence of agency 
theory. Firstly, the theory conceptually divides the SACCO into two groups of participants, one 
the managers and the other, the owners. Secondly, Agency Theory suggests that employees and 
managers in SACCOs will be self-interested. Members of SACCOs expect the agents to act and 
make decisions in the principals’ interest; but the agent may not necessarily make decisions in 
the best interests of the principals (Padilla, 2002). In Agency Theory, the agent may succumb to 
self-interest, opportunistic behavior and falling short of the agreement between the interest of the 
principal and the agent’s pursuits. However, Agency Theory was introduced basically as a 
separation of ownership and control (Bhimani, 2008). Agency theory in this study is applied to 
explore the relationship between the ownership and management structure and to align the goals 
of the management with that of the owners.  
The Agency Theory is relevant in that it recognizes the separation of the ownership of the 
SACCOs from the agents. Through agency theory, the board plays the role of conformance in 
safeguarding the principals’ interest by overseeing the management of the SACCOs and 
checking compliance. Agency theory identifies the roles of the board in serving the members by 
ratifying the decisions made by the managers and monitoring the implementation of those 
decisions. Agents will act opportunistically, maximizing their own benefit at the cost of the 
principals. Hence, a series of controls have to be imposed on agents to ensure that they do all 
they can for the shareholders. The principal incurs monitoring costs in hiring an external auditor 
as part of the controls. 
2.2.2. Stakeholder Theory  
Stakeholders are those who affect or are affected by the actions of the organization. In 
Stakeholder theory the suppliers, employees and investors have a relationship with the managers 
who serve them (Donaldson and Preston, 1995). 
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Communities are interested in the SACCO society’s governance as key stakeholders as they 
derive benefits from being employees, suppliers, customers of quality products and beneficiaries 
of corporate social responsibility policies of SACCOs (Agumba, 2008). 
 
SACCOs are voluntarily set up by their members, aiming to satisfy their own needs. Members 
have two relationships with SACCOs. They are both owners and consumers. Because of their 
ownership relationship to SACCOs they are investor-driven and stakeholders by design (Tirole, 
2002). By virtue of their user-relationship to the SACCO, members are user-driven and natural 
stakeholders (Tirole, 2002). Members are therefore the final and dominant stakeholders 
(Mitchell, Agle and Wood (1997), having the power to make their claims heard and to influence 
the way in which they will be taken care of. Their claims are critical (Jonker & Foster, 2002), 
being the very reason for the SACCOs’ existence. 
 
 Freeman (1984) agrees that the relationship with many groups can affect decision making 
processes as stakeholder theory is concerned with the nature of these relationships in terms of 
both processes and outcomes for the firm and its stakeholders. Stakeholder theory concentrates 
on decisions made by managers and the interests of all stakeholders that have a face value and no 
sets of interest are assumed to dominate the other (Donaldson and Preston, 1995). The relevance 
of this theory is to the systems of SACCOs, mainly financial in nature, owned and controlled by 
the members for the provisions of small scale financial services. Every member of the SACCO is 
a stakeholder and is expected to participate in the major decision making of the SACCOs with a 
view to ensuring its survival. 
 
The theory is relevant in SACCO governance due to transparency and disclosure purposes. 
Stakeholders of SACCOs have the right to be provided with information about how the SACCO 
is affecting them for example provision of employment, community sponsorship, safety 
initiative, public reporting etc. The inter relationship between various stakeholders increase the 
transparency of SACCOs activities and performance, hence achieving its goals including an 
increased profitability. SACCOs are motivated to disclose information about their various 
programs to the stakeholders concerned as a sign of conformance with the stakeholders’ 
expectations. Therefore stakeholder related activities are useful in developing and maintaining 
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satisfactory relationship with members, creditors, employees, customers etc. of the SACCOs. 
Disclosing essential reports to the stakeholders of the SACCOs is the work of management 
because proper disclosure builds good relationships between owners and managers’. 
2.2.3 Stewardship theory – a partnership model 
Firm survival is a result of shareholders’ wealth maximization and stewardship protection (Davis 
et al, 1997). By doing so, the stewards’ utility functions are maximized. Stewards protect and 
make profits on behalf of shareholders and therefore are considered as managers. Stewardship 
theory therefore insists on the role of management and integrates the goals as part of the 
organization (Abdullah & Valentine, 2009). The idea of stewardship is that managers are 
satisfied and motivated when organizational success is achieved. Governance structures that 
empower managers and that offer maximum independence built on trust are highly recognized in 
stewardship theory. It emphasizes employees working independently so that the returns of 
shareholders can be maximized. This minimizes the costs and controls the employee’s behavior. 
Managers are supposed to maximize the firm’s financial soundness and the shareholders’ profits 
in order to protect their reputation. It is therefore argued that the firm’s performance has a direct 
impact on the steward’s individual performance (Odera, 2012). 
 
Stewardship Theory in a SACCO considers how managers work effectively as stewards of the 
respective SACCOs. At the same time, the role of the board of a SACCO needs to be strategic in 
order to add value to top decision making in regards to stewardship theory. Therefore the 
appointment of the board members requires expertise to add value to the organization’s decision 
making. For SACCOs this raise the questions on how can the boards have the necessary 
expertise when their members are elected. 
 
The Stewardship Theory is useful to this study in that it stresses the role of executive 
management (stewards) in maximizing the members’ wealth. They achieve this goal by 
implementing sound internal control systems to protect SACCOs members’ wealth. The theory 
appreciates the importance of structure which empowers the agents and allows steward’s 
independence, thus segregating their duties. Stewards are satisfied and motivated when 
SACCOs’ objectives of financial soundness and profit are attained. This theory will assist in 
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identifying the role of internal controls set by board for the stewards to safeguard the principals’ 
wealth in the SACCOs. 
2.3. Factors and principles influencing corporate governance 
The Organization for Economic Co-operation and Delivery OECD principles describe corporate 
governance as a set of relationships between a company’s management, its board, its 
shareholders, and other stakeholders. Corporate governance provides the structure in which the 
objectives of the company are set, and the means of attaining those objectives and monitoring 
performance are determined. 
 
OECD (2003) and Claessens (2003) note that the following issues are behind the move to affect 
corporate governance among institutions: 
The downfall of major firms, both in the financial and non-financial sectors, such as Polly Peck, 
BCCI and later Barings led to more importance on controls (OECD, 2003). The change in the 
patterns of share ownership in the United Kingdom and United States led to a bigger 
concentration of share ownership in the hands of institutional investors like pension funds and 
insurance firms. External funding to family owned business and State owned enterprises from 
local or overseas sources seeks corporate governance to play a major role to provide legitimacy 
so that they can obtain external funding at the lowest risk. This has made organizations to 
enhance the importance of internal controls as a component of corporate governance. 
 
 One aim of the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2006) was to enhance corporate 
governance practices for banking organizations. The areas in which the committee thought 
required adequate focus include: board responsibilities; senior management; risk management 
and internal controls; compensation; complex or opaque corporate structure; and transparency 
and disclosure. These areas were considered to protect the financial soundness of the banks.   
Therefore, the key governance pillars mostly acceptable and forming the frameworks in this 
study are as follows: 
2.3.1 Board and Corporate Governance 
Boards of directors should be elected through a managed and effective process which ensures 
that an appropriate mixture of competent individuals holds office who are able to add value and 
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bring self-judgment in the decision making process (CBK 2001). Boards of directors should 
ensure the survivability of corporations by determining the purpose and values of these 
corporations, setting strategies and standards that protect corporation assets (CBK, 2001).  
The board should ensure that a proper management structure is in place to maintain corporate 
integrity, reputation and responsibility. Implementation of strategies, policies and management 
performance assessment should be looked at and approved by the board of directors of the 
organization. In addition, the boards constantly review the viability and financial sustainability of 
the enterprise and do so at least one a year (CBK, 2001). The board should identify the 
corporation’s internal and external stakeholders and determine how the corporation should relate 
to all these groups. The board should ensure that no one person or group of persons has 
unfettered power and that there is an appropriate balance of power on the board so that it can 
function objectively and with independent judgment (CBK, 2001). This improves the 
management of the organization by reducing any conflict that may arise hence strengthening the 
corporate governance. 
 
It is not always that directors do perform their legal duties of control and services as directors 
neither evaluate CEOs performance thoroughly; enhance the company’s reputation; nor do they 
advise managers properly (Epstein, 1986; Louden 1982). This happens because most of the 
directors work outside the organization and are not employed full time. This limit directors in 
controlling and evaluating the CEOs performance. 
Lynch (1979), in analyzing two organization found an increased revenue turnover and profits 
when board members increased their involvement in strategic activities. A study done on 418 US 
corporations in regards of CEO compensation and firms performance index found a positive 
correlation between CEO compensation and firm performance (Tosi & Gomez-meja, 1994). 
When board members are involved in strategic activities, they ensure those activities are 
implemented to the end and to the stakeholders’ satisfaction. 
2.3.2. Transparency and disclosure 
Transparency is a system of checks and balances between the major players, i.e. the board of 
directors, senior level of management, auditors and other stakeholders (Bhasin, 2009). Steger & 
Amman (2008) found that every institution has a governance mechanism which distributes 
power and responsibilities and as a result, accounts for its performance. The separation of the 
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ownership from management is an important aspect of corporate governance since it creates an 
effective framework of transparency and accountability (Alo, 2008).  
Disclosure consists of all forms of voluntary corporate communications (Healy and Palepu, 
2001). Good corporate governance disclosure systems indicate that the organization is able to 
impress the market with its integrity. All key issues concerning  corporate governance of the firm 
should be disclosed in a timely fashion and the disclosure should be clear, concise, precise and 
governed by the ‘substance over form’ principle (Bhasin and Manama, 2009). 
Due to governance scandals, organizations have carried out regulatory changes. Some changes 
are to increase disclosure standards in organizations. After Enron, WorldCom and other public 
company governance failures, the Sarbanes Oxley Act were adopted which requires detailed 
information of off- balance – sheet financing. 
 The Cadbury Report (1992) noted the risk of incomplete information or distorted disclosure. 
Incomplete information is intended to mislead, distort or confuse stakeholders. The lemon 
problem comes in when investors cannot separate between good and bad information (Healy and 
Papelu, 2001). Voluntary disclosure mitigates the lemon problem since a poor security may 
appear as a good one and as result, more bad securities will be offered than good securities. The 
cost of the capital to the skeptical investor can be lowered by greater disclosure and transparency 
(Lundholm and Van Winkle, 2006). Thus by adverse selection avoidance, disclosure and 
transparency lower the firm’s cost of capital. A well governed organization is seen by investors 
to be responsive to information on governance issues (Okeahalam and Akinboade, 2003). 
 
Total transparency and disclosure of financial information are important pillars of corporate 
governance framework (OECD, 1999). Firms with higher corporate governance quality make 
more informative disclosures (Beeks & Brown, 2005). Timely and accurate disclosure of 
information improves common understanding of the structures, activities and policies of the firm 
and as a result the firm gains confidence and attract investors (Junarso, 2006, p.4) 
Lack of transparency has been identified as a key reason for the financial crisis facing 
organization (Hellwig, 2009). Companies which provide voluntarily information on governance 
have a lower cost of equity capital(Collet & Hrasky,2008).Disclosure policy is a predictor for the 
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interrelation between corporate governance and firm performance (Habib,2008).However, there 
is causality between timely disclosure and economic profit (Haat et al,2008). 
2.3.3 Internal Controls 
Internal controls ensure that appropriate financial, operational and compliance controls are put in 
place (Sulaiman, 2003).It is the board’s duty to report on the strength and weaknesses of these 
controls and whether they are functioning as required. The inadequacy or lack of controls can 
cause fraud which if unchecked, will cause the downfall of the organization. Internal control is 
connected with the risk management function and linked with the internal audit function. 
The accounting scandals like Enron which were happening in early 21st century brought in the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002; requiring firms to keep and disclose internal controls over financial 
reporting. Firms with material internal control weakness are complex, smaller and less profitable 
(Ge & McVay, 2005); have a lower earnings quality (Doyle et al, 2005).The effect of material 
weakness have a negative return on the cost of capital and on stock prices (Beneish et al,2006). 
However, Ashbough-Skaife et al. (2006) and Bryan and Lilien (2005) did not find a negative 
market reaction to the disclosures of material weaknesses. 
 2.4. Governance of SACCO societies as per SASRA 2008 Act 
The current study reviews the relationship between the corporate governance and financial 
soundness with a focus on the governance of SACCO societies as per SASRA 2008 Act. SASRA 
2008 Act highlights the importance and the role of the three pillars of corporate governance. The 
three pillars include transparency and disclosure, internal controls and the board responsibilities. 
Transparency and disclosure: The chief executive of a SACCO frequently and adequately 
informs the board about the operations through presentations of relevant board papers. The 
Board is entitled to get monthly, quarterly and annual financial statements showing present 
performance compared with the previous period actual performance, budget compared with 
actual expenditure and narrations for any variance. The Board should be informed about the 
capital structure and adequacy. Disclosure of delinquent loan list, loan losses, recoveries and 
provisioning is required. A comprehensive statement of income monthly, quarterly and yearly 
with the budgeted against actual should be prepared. Sources and distribution on profit of 
savings and deposits need to be presented to the board. All insider dealings and non- performing 
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insider loans require to be disclosed. Compliance with the Act or departure from it, and any other 
applicable laws need be reported. Disclosure of large risk exposure, investment portfolio, 
regulatory reports, internal reports and any other relevant areas to the SACCO Society’s 
operations are to be reported. 
Internal control: The audit committee, composed of independent members of the board of 
directors, is supposed to review the financial situation of the SACCO society, its internal 
controls, performance and findings of the internal auditors and to recommend remedial actions at 
least once in every three months. The committee makes sure that internal controls are there and 
effectively maintained to achieve financial reporting objectives. The audit committee also 
reviews internal controls plus the scope of the internal audit program, findings and recommend 
action to be taken. They do review internal audit reports and their overall effectiveness, the scope 
and depth of audit coverage, reports on internal control and any recommendations and confirm 
that appropriate action has been taken. They make sure that accounting records and financial 
reports are prepared and reflect the performance of the SACCO. 
Co-ordination between the internal and external audit functions and monitoring independence of 
external auditors in consideration of the relevant professional and regulatory requirements is 
done through the audit committee. With the assistance of external auditor, the internal auditors 
reviews the scope of the annual audit plan, the systems of internal audit reports and recommend 
the auditor’s remuneration to the board. Management reviews, internal and external reports in 
regards to deviations and weaknesses in accounting and operational controls. The audit 
committee reviews the internal audit plan in reference to the procedures for identifying 
regulatory risks and controlling their results plus receiving communication from the authority 
and the response from the management.  
The committee also looks at the ethical conduct of the SACCO plus the effectiveness of 
procedures for handling and reporting complaints. Any third party transactions arising within the 
SACCO are reviewed by the audit committee, which makes sure that relevant plans, policies and 
control procedures are set and properly administered. It is their duty to ensure those policies and 
control procedures are adequate to protect against error, carelessness, conflict of interest, self-
dealing and fraud. To enhance internal controls, they do investigate members’ complaints, keep 
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minutes of their work and take into account any matter of significance raised at the Annual 
General Meeting. 
Board: According to SASRA (2008) the board of directors exercises fiduciary duties. The 
management of the SACCO is required to keep proper and accurate records reflecting the true 
and fair position of the SACCO under the control of the board. It is the role of the board to see 
that the SACCO functions effectively and has effective and adequate internal control systems. 
Other board duties include the setting key policies, including those relating to human resource, 
credit, investment, savings, liquidity, information preservation, dividend, and risk management.  
The board is supposed to meet not more than twelve times in a financial year; not more than two 
months should lapse between the date of one meeting and the date of the next meeting. The 
SACCO is supposed to make adequate provisions for known and probable losses which are 
likely to occur as stipulated by the regulations formulated by the board. SASRA requires the 
SACCO to keep a positive image within the industry and the economy as a whole; this is another 
role of the board. The directors set the number of the management committees like audit and 
credit which may be required to assist discharging the functions of the board. The board is 
responsible for the production of annual audited accounts which must be presented at an annual 
general meeting held not later than four months after the end of a financial year. A SACCO 
director must attend board meetings regularly; s/he ceases to hold office if s/he fails to attend 
three consecutive meetings without permission or reasonable cause. 
2.5. Review of Related Empirical Literatures on corporate governance and firm’s finance 
soundness 
There is a positive relationship between corporate governance and the growth of the firm 
valuation. This was found in a study by Beiner, Drobetz, Schmid and Zimmerman (2004). The 
study based firm valuation by using corporate governance indices and related variables such as 
ownership structures and board characteristics for Swiss firms.  
Research done in Ghana, South Africa, Nigeria and Kenya found that good corporate governance 
practices are associated with high valuations and better operating performance   (Kyereboah-
Coleman (2007).  
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A study done to establish corporate governance practices and their relationship with the growth 
of listed companies in Nairobi found a positive linear relationship between growth and corporate 
governance (Kariuki et al; 2011) .Ongore and K’Obonyo (2011) did a study on the relationship 
between ownership, board and manager characteristics and firm performance for 54 companies 
listed at the Nairobi Securities Exchange. From this study it was found that there was a positive 
relationship between the board performance and corporate governance. Mang’unyi (2011) 
carried out a study to explore the ownership structure and corporate governance and its effects on 
the performance of firms. His study focused on selected banks in Kenya. His study revealed that 
there was a significant difference between corporate governance and financial soundness of 
banks. The study recommended that corporate entities should promote corporate governance to 
send positive signals to potential investors and those regulatory agencies, including the 
government, should promote and socialize corporate governance and its relationship to firm 
performance across industries. Miring’u and Muoria (2011) analyzed the effects of corporate 
governance on the performance of commercial state corporations in Kenya. Using a descriptive 
study design, the study sampled 30 state corporations out of 41. The study found a positive 
relationship between Return on Equity (ROE) and board composition in regards to gender 
balance of all state corporations. 
2.6. Corporate governance of SACCOs 
Firms with a higher quality of corporate governance do well financially (Bauer and Guenster, 
2003; Beiner et al., 2004; Schmidt & Zimmermann, 2004). Diversified companies with good 
governance have 2.1 percent higher return compared to organization with poor corporate 
governance (Bauer and Guenster, 2003). There is a positive correlation between good corporate 
governance and better operating results and market valuation (Klapper and Love, 2002).  
Corporate governance mechanisms assure investors in corporations that they will receive 
adequate returns on their investments (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). In addition, Williams (2000), 
Drobetz et al. (2003) and Gemmill and Thomas (2004) concluded in their respective studies that 
there is a positive relationship between good corporate governance practices and firm financial 
soundness.  
Good corporate governance requires several decisions to be made as SACCOs are becoming 
bigger and more complex. Managers are recruited to make critical management decisions since 
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the shareholders may not have the needed managerial skills and technical knowledge (Abdullah 
& Valentine, 2009). Professional expertise needs to operate in an entrepreneurial manner due to 
the specialization of decisions. It is however noted that the separation of ownership and decision 
making leads to principal-agent problems (Odera, 2012). 
Board: This is the interrelationship between the shareholders and the management of the 
organization with the latter being authorized to carry out the day today operations (Stiles and 
Taylor, 2001). Key responsibilities of the board include strategic, controlling, institutional 
capacity, approving core philosophy, maintenance of legal and ethical practices, communication 
with shareholders and review (Riana, 2008; Zahra and Pearce, 1989; ICC, 2009). The statutory 
framework of a company explains the onus of the board of directors. 
Internal management decisions of SACCOs are delegated by the board (Branch &Baker, 1998). 
Major policy initiatives and the general strategy of the SACCOs are controlled and approved by 
the board besides hiring, firing and setting the compensation packages of the managers (Odera, 
2012).  
Another way of monitoring and controlling SACCOs is through a supervisory committee. 
Regular supervision and surveillance ensures SACCOs operate with an established legal 
framework, therefore ensuring safety, soundness and integrity of their operations, with the 
ultimate goal of protecting SACCO members’ funds. SASRA processes the licenses for Deposit 
Taking SACCO Societies, monitors and evaluates their performance continuously reviews and 
improves policy, and the regulatory and supervisory framework (SACCO Supervision Annual 
Report 2012). 
2.6.1 SACCO governance problems 
SACCO managers need specific knowledge and skills to make a number of specialized decisions 
as they become bigger and more complex (Branch & Baker, 1998). According to Branch & 
Baker (1998), problems in SACCOs mostly occur due to one or more of the following causes: 
 
(i) SACCO members tend to have a lower to moderate level of income and these have an impact 
on elected board members who may interfere with the management of the SACCO. This 
interference contributes to weak administration, low morale and the inability of the SACCO to 
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attract good quality managers (Odera, 2012). The operations of the SACCO are interfered with 
by members of the Board of directors for example, when a member is denied a loan by the 
management team he/she contact a director who comes in and over-rules the decision of 
management. 
(ii) Failure of the members and boards to exercise fiduciary responsibility: Due to the large 
number of SACCO members which some SACCOs operate with more than 50,000 or 100,000 
members, operational interference by the management board may occur (Branch & Baker, 1998). 
This makes only a few members to carry out the duties of monitoring the performance of the 
SACCO by attending the annual general meeting or by looking elected members in the board. 
Collusion amongst the board, manager and supervisory committee may occur so as to protect one 
another’s interest at the expense of the SACCO due to minimal supervision from the membership 
(Odera, 2012).  
(iii) The borrower domination effect: SACCO members are at the same time clients, savers, 
borrowers and suppliers. This complicates the corporate governance system of SACCOs as it is 
supposed to respond to two sets of owner-clients. The customers and supplier relationship lack 
clear governance rules and may provide a weak credit approval policy which can be manipulated 
by the directors (Odera, 2012).  
(iv) Membership ownership: Berle and Means (1932) set forth that ownership dispersion implies 
when management is distinguished from ownership, which, as Jensen and Meckling (1976) 
emphasize, may contribute to agency problems between managers and shareholders or 
shareholders and debtors. On the other hand, Shleifer and Vishny (1986) and Morck, Shleifer 
and Vishny (1988) detect the phenomenon of ownership concentration. La Porta et al. (1999) and 
Claessens et al. (2000) usher in the concept of ultimate controller and noted that most of the 
shareholders control and dominate listed firms by means of pyramid structure and cross holding, 
which could result in a central agency problem. Shleifer and Vishny (1997) argue that ownership 
concentration is, along with legal protection, one of two key determinants of corporate 
governance. 
(v) Lack of clear rules, combined with credit rationing: This occurs when there is excessive and 
poor manipulation of the procedures in credit granting by the board. These governance problems 
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are due to the combination of the traditional borrower – dominated  service structure plus 
situations in which rules for decision making and controls are not properly defined and enforced. 
Weak internal controls of SACCOs facilitate the board members to give out loans for their own 
gain and as political favours (Branch & Baker, 1998). 
2.7. Relationship between Governance and financial soundness  
A number of studies that have examined the relationship between corporate governance and the 
operations of the firm show that good governance practices increase the economic value of the 
firm, as well as higher productivity and lower systematic risk (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997; John 
and Senbet, 1998 and Hermalin and Weisbach, 1991). Brown & Caylor (2009) analyzed US 
firms and their findings indicate that better governed firms are relatively more profitable, more 
valuable and pay more cash to their shareholders as good governance was associated with the 
firm performance. 
 
In his study, Mitton (2002) found out that the firms which record better price performance are 
associated with those which have indicators of higher disclosure quality and higher outside 
ownership concentration. A firm’s financial soundness improves by limiting the board size, since 
the benefits of larger boards are reduced by poorer communication and decision – making of 
larger groups (Lipton, Lorsch, 1993). However, Yermack (1996) shows that there is no 
relationship between board size, profitability and asset utilization.  Because creditors see firms 
with bigger boards having effective monitoring in their financial processes, the cost of debt is 
therefore lower (Anderson et al.2004). 
Adjaoud et al. (2007) examined the relationship between firm performance and governance 
scores. They found that the relationship was not significant between the scores and accounting-
based measures of performance (such as ROI, ROE, EPS, and market-to-book) while the 
relationship between the scores and measures of value created, such as market value added and 
economic value added, was generally significant. 
2.7.1.  Measuring licensed deposit taking SACCO’s financial soundness 
The licensed deposit taking SACCOs are required to observe minimum operational regulations 
and prudential standards in the conduct of SACCO business. SASRA adopts the CAMEL 
evaluating framework to measure and monitor the financial soundness of the deposit taking 
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SACCOs (SACCO Supervision Annual Report 2012). The acronym “CAMEL ‘refers to Capital 
adequacy, Asset quality, Management, Earnings and Liquidity. However, Credit unions and 
other savings institutions use PEARLS as a monitoring system for financial soundness; the 
acronym is explained below; it is used for management guidance; it is an international measure 
and is recognized globally (Richardson 2001). It is also a tool to regulate the managers of 
SACCOs. PEARLS as a set of financial ratios assists in harmonizing terminology between credit 
unions. It helps managers find meaningful solutions to serious institutional problems. Therefore 
in this research we used PEARLS to measure the financial soundness of SACCOs. 
The acronym PEARLS measures key areas of SACCO’s operations as follows: 
Protection: Protection ensures that SACCOs provide depositors a safe place to save their money. 
Adequate protection of assets is a basic tenet of the new SACCOs model. Protection is measured 
by comparing the adequacy of the allowances for loan losses against the amount of delinquent 
loans. Loans that are greater than 12 months delinquent must be fully provided for (Richardson 
2001). 
 
Effective financial structure (EFS): The EFS variable affects the growth, the profitability and 
the efficiency of SACCOs. The assets, the liabilities and the capital of a SACCO are measured 
and an ideal structure is recommended. For the assets of SACCOs, 95% of  total  assets must be  
composed of loans to members  and the ideal range is between 70% and 80% whereas  liquid 
investments is between 10% and20%.Unproductive assets such as fixed assets i.e land , 
buildings, equipment  takes the balance of 5%. The most profitable asset of the SACCOs is the 
loan portfolio and the World Council of credit Unions recommends 70-80% of total assets in the 
loan portfolio. Under liabilities, 70-80% is recommended on member deposit savings (World 
council of credit Unions, 2002). A high percentage of deposit savings shows that the SACCO is 
in it way of achieving financial independence. A SACCO has an effective financial structure 
when assets, financed by savings deposits, generate sufficient income to pay market rates on 
savings, cover operating costs and maintain capital adequacy. The effective financial structure 
concentrates on an institution’s sources of funds and its uses of funds. 
 
Asset quality: Asset Quality is the most important component that affects SACCO’s 
profitability. Excessive default or prolonged loans repayment and high rate of other non – 
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earning assets impact negatively on SACCO’s earnings since these assets are not earning 
income. The delinquency ratios as total outstanding balance of loans greater than 30 days is a 
measure of institutional weakness since if it is high, other important areas of SACCO operations 
could be weak for example loan loss provision, institutional capital and net income. The ideal 
goal is to maintain the delinquency rate below 5% of total loan outstanding. Percentage of Non-
Earning Assets ratio implies that the higher the ratio, the more difficult it is to generate enough 
earnings. The goal is to keep this ratio to a maximum of 5% of the total SACCO assets. 
Financing of Non- Earning Assets such as fixed assets without impacting earnings negatively, 
need to be financed with no-cost capital such as institutional capital or reserves (World council 
of credit Unions, 2002). 
 
Rates of return and costs: The Rates of return and costs measures the return earned on each 
type of assets and the cost of each liability. One can therefore know the types of assets in 
SACCO’s that generate highest returns and the least and most expensive source of funds on the 
liability side. SACCOs or institution growth rates are directly affected by yields and costs.Net 
Loan Income divided by Average Net Loan Portfolio aim for loan prices to be set at 
entrepreneurial rates which is required to cover the cost of funds, operations, administration, 
provisions and cost of contributions to increase capital (World council of credit Unions, 2002). 
 
Liquidity: Managing liquidity is an important component of administering a SACCO. Liquidity 
in a SACCO refers the cash needed for withdrawals. A sound financial management of SACCOs 
requires keeping adequate liquidity reserves. The total liquidity reserves which measures the 
percentage of savings deposits invested as liquid assets is  maintained at a minimum of 15% after 
paying all short-term obligations ( 30 days and under). Idle liquidity reserves is kept to a 
minimum level and therefore reduced to a percentage close to zero (World council of credit 
Unions, 2002). 
 
Signs of Growth: Signs of growth shows satisfaction of member – client and likeness of product 
offered plus the financial strength of SACCOs. SACCO financial structure is linked directly by 
the growth and therefore requires close monitoring to maintain balance. Growth in total assets is 
a key ratio and by comparing it to other important areas, enables to detect changes in the balance 
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sheet that may impact positively or negatively on earnings. The ideal goal of all SACCOs is to 
get real positive growth each year. If the loan portfolios grow hands in hand with total assets, 
profitability will be maintained. Due to savings mobilization, savings deposits are the new key of 
growth in SACCOs since it affects the growth of other important areas. The best indicator of 
profitability in SACCOs is the growth of institutional capital and especially when it is greater 
than the growth of total assets. 
2.7.2. Conceptual Framework 
The variables considered were independent and dependent. The independent or predictor 
variables are the inputs tested to see if they are the cause. The dependent or response variable are 
the output and is tested to show the effect.  
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2.8. Operationalization of variables 
2.8.1. Dependent variables 



















1. P- Protection 
Protection ration is measured on allowances for loan losses divided by delinquency greater than 
twelve months  
P =Allowance for Loan Losses / Allowances Required for Loans Delinquent >12 months. 
Goal is to achieve 100%. 
2. E- Effective Financial Structure 
This is measured by net loans divided by total assets ratio  
 E= Net Loans/Total Assets 
Goal is between 70 -80%. 
3. A- Asset Quality 
This is measured by total loan delinquency divided by gross loan portfolio  
A=Total Loan Delinquency / Gross Loan Portfolio 
The goal of excellence is less than or equal to 5%. 
4. R- Rates of Return and Costs 
Rates of return and costs were measured by total operating expenses divided by average total 
assets ratio. 
R=Total Operating Expenses / Average Total Assets 
Goal is less than 10%. 
5. L- Liquidity 
The ratio used to measure liquidity is liquid investments plus liquid assets minus short term 
payables divided by savings deposits. 
L=S.T Investments + Liquid Assets - S.T. Payables /Savings Deposits 
Goal was minimum 15%. 
6. S- Signs of Growth 
This is measured by the growth in total assets. 
S =Total current year assets/Total assets as of the Last year –end 
 
The goal is that the growth in total assets should to be higher than the inflation rate. 
 
Thirteen cross sections of SACCOs are represented in the sample. To compare performance 
measures across this SACCOs, financial ratios are transformed by corresponding goals of 
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excellence ratios set by WOCCU for PEARLS system. This method is like that of Dehaene, De 
Vuyst, and Ooghe (2001); and Platt and Platt (1991), who transformed financial data by industry 
ratios. 
The financial ratios used in this study are transformed as follows: 
 
  Yj 
Yaj =    
     
  Ῡa 
Where Yaj   represents the transformed performance variable of choice, j is the individual 
SACCOs,  a indicates the sector (WOCCU), Ῡa is the WOCCUs goals of excellence (median) 
financial measure. In this study Yj is the calculated ratios for the 4yrs and Ῡa  is the goals of 
excellence set by WOCCU. 
2.8.2.  Independent Variables   
Board, Transparency and disclosure plus the internal controls were the independent variables. 
The Board was measured by assessing duties and responsibilities it plays in SACCO 
performance. Transparency and disclosure was measured based on factors like presentation of 
relevant board papers,  completeness of financial statements , declaration of delinquent loan list , 
loan losses etc. The internal controls were measured by looking the role of the audit committee it 
played in the performance of the SACCO. 
2.8.3. Basic Model 
The study used multiple linear regression analysis in determining the relationship between 
corporate governance and financial soundness of SACCOs. The basic model for this concept is 
shown below: 
FSS=f (BO, leverage)        (1) 
Where, 
FSS is financial soundness of the SACCOs (PEARLS); BO is the Board, and leverage factors 
(Transparency and disclosure, and internal controls). 
The expansion of the basic model given in equation 1 will give a simple regressions model given 
in equation 2 which was used to determine if there is an association between corporate 




FSSββ1B0β2TDβ3IC  (2) 
Where FSS measured by PEARLS = Protection, Effective financial structure, Asset quality, 
Rates of return, Liquidity and Signs of growth are the dependent variables, 
 The constant terms, 
 Coefficient of independent variable i.e Board, Transparency and disclosure and 
Internal controls, 
 Error term which represents other factors not included in the model. 
2.9. Conclusion  
From the literature, it can be seen that there is, a link between good corporate governance and the 
financial soundness of the entity. This study aims to replicate these studies to examine whether 













CHAPTER THREE – METHODOLOGY 
3.1 Introduction 
This chapter provides information on the type of research design applied for the study, 
population and sampling, data collection and data analysis. 
3.2 Research Design 
The research used a descriptive design to determine objective one .This assured useful and 
reliable information answering the questions based on who, what, when and how (Rombo and 
Tromp, 2006). In the second objective the aim was to see if there is a relationship between 
corporate governance and financial soundness; therefore correlation design was appropriate. This 
was to explore or examine data and looking for potential relation between variables.  
3.3 Target Population and Sampling of the study 
The target population of this study was all the licensed deposit taking SACCOs that are operating 
in Nairobi County, estimated to number 43 as at June 2014.The study considered the entire 
population of the 43 SACCOs. The respondents were the Chief Executive Officers (CEOs), 
senior managers and other senior officers of the SACCOs. This is because they are conversant 
with the management of their respective SACCOs. 
3.4 Data Collection 
The study collected primary data for the purpose of studying the effect between corporate 
governance and financial soundness of licensed deposit taking SACCOs in Kenya. Primary data 
were collected using a questionnaire (appendix A) which was dropped in the SACCOs offices; 
SACCO officials CEO, senior managers and other senior officers completed the questionnaires 
and later collected. The questionnaire was in likert-scale format. To measure the financial 
soundness, secondary data were collected from the thirteen audited financial statements of 







3.5  Data Analysis 
3.5.1  Inferential analysis 
Data collected were analyzed by descriptive and inferential techniques. The findings were 
presented using tables and charts, percentages, means and other central tendencies. Tables were 
used to summarize responses for further analysis and facilitate comparison. The tables generated 
quantitative reports through tabulations, percentages, and measures of central tendency. The 
questionnaires which were in likert type scales were analyzed using descriptive techniques i.e 
mean, standard deviation and frequencies. 
3.5.2 Financial ratios 
The SACCOs PEARLS financial ratios were computed and analyzed basing on the goals of 
excellence set by the World council of credit union (Richardson, 2001).PEARLS ratios are an 
internationally proven methodology for improving operational efficiency in credit unions 
worldwide. SASRA adopted CAMEL model since most of the commercial financial institution 
use it and to be in line with peer regulator (The Central Bank of Kenya).In this study we used 
PEARLS since it has two more significant ratios which are not in CAMEL model. The two ratios 
are the effective financial structure and the signs of growth ratios which play important roles for 
the survivability of SACCOs (Richardson, 2001). The effective financial structure ratio evaluate 
the financial structure of the balance sheet which has a direct impact on efficiency and 
profitability. Signs of growth ratio considers growth of total assets as a key strategy to preserve 
the value of SACCOs assets. The world council of credit union which is the umbrella regulator 
of cooperative unions worldwide recommends PEARLS model as the rating framework for 
unions (Richardson, 2001). 
3.5.3  Correlation analysis 
Correlation analysis was used to determine the level of association between independent and 
dependent variables (Levin & Rubin, 1998). Correlation value of 0 indicated that there was no 
relationship between independent and dependent variables. Correlation of ± 1.0 means that there 
is a perfect positive or negative relationship. The variables were analyzed between 0 and 1.0 
relationship. The relationship was ranked as follows: r = ± 0.1 to ± 0.29 small; r = ± 0.3 to ± 0.49 
medium; r = ±0.5 and above considered as strong. 
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3.5.4   Regression analysis 
This study applied a multiple linear regression analysis using PEARLS ratios as dependent 
variables for the SACCOs financial soundness whereas independent variables comprised of 
board responsibility, transparency and disclosure and internal controls. 
The regression analysis generated an equation to examine the statistical relationship between the 
corporate governance pillars (independent variables) and PEARLS ratios (dependent variables). 
The mean change in the response variable for one unit of change in the prediction variable was 
represented by regression coefficients while holding other predictors in the model constant. The 
regression coefficients isolate the role of one variable from all of the others in the model (Bails 
& Peppers, 1993).  ANOVA was used to test whether deposits taking SACCOs have proper 
corporate governance structures or not. 
 
P-values and F-values and R – squared in the model were interpreted to examine the strength 
between dependent and independent variables. 
This study employed following model: 
FSSββ1B0β2TDβ3IC  (2) 
Where  = the Financial soundness of the SACCOs measured by PEARLS as dependent variables, 
 The constant terms, 
 Coefficient of independent variable i.e. Board, Transparency and disclosure and 
Internal controls, 
 Error term which represents other factors not included in the model. 
The above model is modified as below to examine the relationship between corporate 
governance and financial soundness of Licensed Deposit Taking SACCOs in Kenya.  
Regression analysis 1.Protection ratio (P) 
P ratioββ1B0β2TDβ3IC 




Regression analysis 3.Asset Quality ratio (A) 
A ratioββ1B0β2TDβ3IC 
Regression analysis 4.Rates of return and costs (R) 
R ratioββ1B0β2TDβ3IC 
Regression analysis 5.Liquidity ratio (L) 
L ratioββ1B0β2TDβ3IC 
Regression analysis 6.Signs of growth ratio (S) 
S ratioββ1B0β2TDβ3IC 
Regression analysis 7.FSS ratio 
FSS ratioββ1B0β2TDβ3IC 
3.6. Validity and Reliability of data 
The study conducted a pilot study on a group of 5 individuals from the target sample of the staff 
working in deposit taking SACCOs to test the reliability of the research instrument. The pilot 
study allowed for pre-testing of the research instrument. The clarity of the instrument items to 
the respondents was necessary so as to enhance the instrument’s validity and reliability. The aim 
was to correct any inconsistencies arising from the instruments, which ensured that they 
measured what is intended. The data were tested for reliability to establish issues such as data 
sources, methods of data collection, the time of collection and the level of accuracy. 
3.7  Ethical issues 
The data collected was for the research purposely only and treated with a lot of confidentiality to 





 CHAPTER FOUR: DATA ANALYSIS AND RESULTS 
4.1 Introduction 
This chapter analyses the data collected and presents research findings. Quantitative data was 
described using statistical analyses. In particular, measures of central tendency; means and 
standard deviation were used. Inferential statistics were also used to draw inferences. Tables, 
graphs and charts were also used in data presentation.  
4.2 Response Rate 
A total of 43 questionnaires were given out to the CEOs, senior managers and other senior 
officials of the 43 licensed deposit taking SACCOs in Nairobi out of which 32 were returned 
giving a response rate of 74.42%.  
The response rate for this study can be therefore said to be very good at this level. This is in 
accordance to the ranking response rate; 50% adequate, 60% good and above 70 % is rated very 
good (Mugenda & Mugenda, 2003).  
The subjects who answered the questionnaires included 2 CEOs, 19 senior managers, and 11 
other staff members who have deep knowledge in their respective SACCOs as indicated in Table 
4.1 below.  
 
The majority of those who responded to the questionnaire had an experience of 5- 10 yrs in their 
SACCOs. 45.5% were in this range as shown in Table 4.2. This shows that they had a wider 




Table 4.1: Job positions of those interviewed 
 
 Frequency Percent 
Valid 




Others 11 34.4 
Total 32 100.0 
    
   
   
 
 
The study also found that majority of the respondents was in senior management.  This means 
that they had deeper knowledge of their respective SACCOs which assisted in answering the 
questionnaire. 
Table 4.2: Job Experience of those interviewed 
 
 Frequency Percent 
Valid 0-5 years 9 28.1 







Total 32 100.0 
 
 
From the study it was found that majority of the respondents had  experience of  5- 10 years 
meaning they had worked long enough to give credible information which was used in this study. 
4.3 Corporate Governance of SACCOs 
The study analyzed three pillars of governance; transparency &disclosure, internal controls and 
Board responsibility using a questionnaire (see appendix A) to establish their influence on 
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financial soundness of SACCOs. The responses were rated on a basis of likert scale 1-5 with five 
implying that the respondents strongly agrees and one strongly disagrees. 
The summary of the responses using a mean scores and standard deviation are represented on 
table below. 
 










Internal Controls 3.71 0.67 
Board Responsibility 3.32 0.77 
 
 
The study showed that the majority of the respondents highly considered internal controls as a 
tenet of corporate governance in SACCOs than the other two pillars of governance as indicated 
in table 4.3 above. Internal Controls had a mean of 3.70, Transparency and disclosure   3.49, 
whereas Board responsibility scored a mean of 3.32. The standard deviation of Internal Controls 
was one of the lowest among the other variables meaning that it was accepted among the 










Transparency and Disclosure    










Financial Statements Presented 32 2.00 5.00 3.45 .67 
Loan Lists Presented 32 2.00 5.00 3.50 .72 
Statement Of Income 32 3.00 5.00 3.63 .61 
Profile Of Saving And Deposits 31 2.00 5.00 3.35 .75 
Insider And Non Insider Loan Info Disclosed 31 3.00 5.00 3.45 .57 
Reports On Violation Of SACCO Act 32 2.00 5.00 3.69 .64 
Reports Relevant To SACCO Operations 
Declared 
32 2.00 4.00 3.38 .61 
Statements On Capital Structure And Adequacy 
Prepared 
32 2.00 5.00 3.47 .62 
Mean of means: 3.49 
Standard Deviation: 0.65 
The study sought to establish the influence of transparency and disclosure on the financial 
soundness of the SACCOs. Using a 5 point Likert scale, Table 4.4 shows a simple descriptive 
statistics with a mean score of 3.49 and a standard deviation of .65 .This indicates that majority 
of the respondents do agree with the view that  transparency  and disclosure is a component of 
corporate governance of most SACCOs in Nairobi. 
Thus with a mean score 3.49 from a maximum point of 5 which is above the midpoint of 5, it is 
observable that transparency and disclosure is an important pillar of corporate governance in 
SACCOs. 
 
The research reviewed the importance of transparency and disclosure on corporate governance of 
SACCOs. The respondents agreed that the reports on the violation of SACCO act plus other 
applicable law is prepared and remedial actions taken to comply as it had a mean of 3.69. 
Respondents also agree that a comprehensive statement of income (monthly, quarterly and 
annual) comparing budget and actual is prepared scoring a mean of 3.63. Delinquent loan list, 
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growth in loans, loan losses, recoveries and provisions were agreed to be well disclosed as 
indicated with a mean of 3.5. 
These findings concur with Junarso (2006) who argued that timely and accurate disclosure of 
information improves the structures, activities and policies of the firm and hence the firm gain 
confidence and attract investors. Okeahalam and Akinboade (2003) also found that a well 
governed organization is seen by investors to be responsive to information on governance issues. 
 
Internal controls   
Table 4.5: Internal controls   
Descriptive Statistics 
 
Mean of means: 3.71 
Standard Deviation: 0.67 
This was to ascertain the influence of internal controls on financial soundness of SACCOs. 
Using a 5 point Likert scale  in  Table 4.5  the  simple descriptive statistics  shows  a mean score 
of 3.71  and a standard deviation of .67 .With this statics the  majority of the respondents do 
agree  that  internal controls in SACCOs governance plays a vital role in SACCOs operations. 
Therefore with a mean score 3.71 from a maximum point of 5 which is above the midpoint of 5, 
we say that internal controls are very necessary in corporate governance of SACCOs. 
 







Established Internal Audit Function 32 2.00 5.00 3.65 .70 
Financial Statements Submitted every 3 Months 32 2.00 5.00 3.66 .70 
Audit Committee Reviews Financial Conditions 
Of SACCO 
32 2.00 5.00 3.72 .73 
AGM Four Months After Financial Year 28 3.00 5.00 3.75 .75 
Internal Controls Set 31 3.00 5.00 3.71 .59 
Accounting And Financial Records 31 3.00 5.00 3.64 .66 
Reports Reviewed Concerning Deviations And 
Weaknesses 
32 3.00 5.00 3.78 .61 
Policies And Procedures Safeguard Against 
Errors 




The research reviewed the importance of internal controls on corporate governance of SACCOs. 
The respondent agreed that SACCO management reports and reports from the internal and 
external auditors are reviewed concerning deviations and weaknesses in accounting and 
operational controls. This scored highly since it is a risk mitigating measure and had a mean 
score of 3.78 and a standard deviation of .61.The respondents were also in agreement that 
SACCOs policies, procedures are adequate to safeguard against errors, carelessness, conflict of 
interest, self dealing and fraud as it had a score of 3.75 and standard deviation of .62.The reason 
behind this is that majority of the SACCO members are interested on how they are being 
managed to ensure their assets are safe. 
The findings of the study concur with Sulaiman (2003) who state that internal controls ensure 
that appropriate financial, operational and compliance controls are put in place. 
Board Responsibility 
Table 4.6: Board Responsibility analysis    
Descriptive Statistics 
 N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. 
Dev. 
Management Maintains 32 2.00 5.00 3.13 .71 
Board Ensures SACCO functions 32 2.00 5.00 3.16 .68 
Board Ensures Adequate Provision 30 2.00 5.00 3.47 .78 
Board Assists In Maintaining Image 32 2.00 5.00 3.44 .84 
Board Sets Up Committees 32 2.00 5.00 3.34 .83 
Board Produces Annual Audited Accounts 32 2.00 5.00 3.19 .78 
Board Appoints And Removes CEO 32 2.00 5.00 3.34 .83 
Board Established Qualification And 
Competence Of CEO 
30 2.00 5.00 3.50 .73 
 
Mean of means: 3.32 
Standard Deviation: 0.77 
A 5 point Likert scale  in  Table 4.6  the  simple descriptive statistics  showed  a mean score of 
3.32  and a standard deviation of .77 .With this statistics the  majority of the respondents hardly 




Therefore with a mean score 3.32 from a maximum point of 5 which is above the midpoint of 5, 
we say that board responsibility is essential in corporate governance of SACCOs though not as 
much like in the transparency and internal controls. 
The study sought to establish the influence of Board of director’s responsibility on financial 
soundness of the SACCO. The report showed that most of the respondents agreed that the board 
have established the qualifications and competence of chief executive officer (CEO).It was also 
agreed that the board should ensure adequate provisions for known and probable losses likely to 
occur are made. The means were 3.5 and 3.47 respectively.  The respondents were neutral to the 
rest of questionnaires on the Board responsibility as shown by the means they got from the study 
in table 4.6. 
 
Results of this study  concur with the findings of  Epstein (1986) and Louden (1982) who argued 
that not always do directors perform their legal duties of control and services .CEOs performance 
are not always evaluated well and that managers are not always advised properly. 
4.4. Financial soundness of SACCOs 
The second objective of this study was to assess the relationship between corporate governance 
and financial soundness of SACCOs. The financial soundness of SACCOs was measured by 
analyzing secondary data using PEARLS ratios for thirteen SACCOs and then run a regression 
analysis to correlate corporate governance with primary data of the corresponding thirteen 
SACCOs. 
4.4.1 PEARLS ratios Analysis 
The PEARLS ratios Analysis was measured using selected PEARLS ratios and compared against 
the monitoring system goals of world council of credit unions. Protection was measured with 
ratio P1, Effective financial structure E1, Asset Quality A1, Rates of return and costs R9, 




Table 4.7: Protection 
 
Loan losses allowances /Allowances for loan delinquent >12 months 
The most critical ratio under protection is allowance for loan losses divided by delinquency 
greater than twelve months. The standard of excellence to measure this ratio is 100%. From the 
above we observe that all the indicated SACCOs achieved this ratio. Results from the data 
collected   showed that the savings of the SACCOs member were not at risk. From appendix C, it 
showed that all SACCOs under study achieved 100% provisions for loan losses from loans that 
were greater than 12 months delinquent. This showed that the SACCOs were prepared against 
any unexpected losses to the firms. However, majority of the SACCO made provisions in the 
two previous year’s .i.e. 2013 and 2012. Therefore, it can be concluded that before year 2012, 











Table 4.8:Effective financial structure 
 
 
Source: Worked out from Audited of the SACCOs 
 
Net loans/ Total Assets 
From data on Table 4.8 above, it is observable that 77 %  of the SACCOs under review met the 
goal of placing 70-80% of its total assets in loans  to its members in 2013. SACCOs 3,5 and 8 
achieved 68%,58% and 67% respectively below the goal of 70-80%. However , in the last three 
years , 2012,2011 and 2010  SACCO 3 achieved the target as follows; 73%,80% and 80% 
respectively.SACCO 5 had 58 % ,63%, and 63% . SACCO 8 had72%, 74%, and 73% .  This 
shows that the majority of SACCOs had a  high opportunity on maximising returns on 
productive assets  and at the same time provided their members with the credit services. From 
appendix C ,in the last four years only SACCO 5 did not get the required percentage of 70-80% 
on average.We can say that the majority of SACCOs were able to fund their assets basically with 
member-client deposits and therefore were independent from the fluctuating price of external 
funds. 






Total loan delinquency/Gross loan portfolio 
From the thirteen SACCOs under study, twelve achieved the ideal goal of maintaining the 
delinquency ratio below 5% of total loans outstanding. This shows that there is an improvement 
in credit administration and collection and this has minimized the portfolio risk. In the last four 
years only SACCO 5 did not achieve a ratio below 5% (Appendix C). Asset quality ratio as a 
measure of institutional weakness, shows that majority of SACCO were strong even in other 
areas of operations. 
Table 4.10:Rates of return and costs 
 
 Total operating expenses/Average total assets 
The operating expense divided by average total assets indicates the degree of operational 
efficiency or inefficiency. This ratio measures the cost associated with the management of the 
SACCO. Out of the thirteen SACCOs reviewed, only SACCO 5, whose ratio was 12%, had more 
than 10% which is considered as the standard of excellence. The rest had less than 10% showing 
that they are operating efficiently. This was the same case in the last four years as indicated in 
the appendix C. 
The average gross margin divided by average total assets for all the thirteen SACCOs is 8%.This 
indicates that the SACCOs are able to generate enough income to cover operating expenses and 





Short term Investments/Total savings deposit 
For the 13 SACCOs under review, 9 SACCOs faced no difficulties maintaining a minimum of 
15% of its savings deposits in liquid instruments in order to satisfy member-client withdrawal 
requests. During the study period consisting of the latest four years (2010 to 2013), SACCO 6 
had a very poor liquidity ratio as shown in appendix C.  
Table 4.12:Signs of growth 
 
Growth in total assets 
The total assets of the studied SACCOs were growing, keeping pace with inflation. The growth 
in SACCO assets has been steady and above annualized inflation of 5.7% for the year 2013 
(National Bureau of Standards, 2013). In appendix C, the majority of the SACCOs showed 
positive trends in total assets growth over the study periods. This growth rate was above the 
inflation rate meaning that SACCOs were able to maintain the real value of the members’ assets 
and protect them from the impact of inflation. A study done to establish corporate governance 
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practices and their relationship with the growth of listed companies in Nairobi found a positive 
linear relationship between growth and corporate governance (Kariuki et al ; 2011)  
4.5  Relationship between Corporate Governance and Financial soundness of SACCOs 
4.5.1 Pearson Correlation 
The main objective of the study was to analyze the relationship between financial soundness and 
corporate governance. The analysis was done using Pearson correlation coefficient and 
regression analysis. The Confidence limit was at 95% and used a two tailed test at a significance 
level of 0.05. 
P-Value less than or equal to 0.05 was considered to be significant and above 0.05 was 
insignificant. 









Pearson Correlation -.296 -.105 -.202 
Sig. (2-tailed) .326 .732 .508 
N 13 13 13 
Effective Financial 
Structure 
Pearson Correlation .709* .678* .731* 
Sig. (2-tailed) .017 .021 .010 
N 13 13 13 
Asset Quality 
Pearson Correlation .233* .188 -.125 
Sig. (2-tailed) .020 .538 .685 
N 13 13 13 
Rates of Return and 
Costs 
Pearson Correlation .118 -.146 .102 
Sig. (2-tailed) .701 .634 .740 
N 13 13 13 
Liquidity 
Pearson Correlation .748* .602* .712* 
Sig. (2-tailed) .009 .023 .018 
N 13 13 13 
Signs of growth 
Pearson Correlation .239 -.550 .100 
Sig. (2-tailed) .432 .051 .745 
N 13 13 13 




Using Pearson correlation coefficient model of assessing financial soundness of the SACCOs, it 
was noted there was a positive correlation coefficient between effective financial structure ratio 
and the three pillars of governance; board .709, transparency and disclosure .678 and internal 
controls .731.The study also found a positive correlation between asset quality and board and 
transparency and disclosure as shown by a coefficient of .233 and .188 respectively. There was a 
positive relationship between the rates of return and the board responsibility and internal controls 
as shown by the Coefficient of .118 and .102 respectively. Liquidity had a positive correlation of 
coefficients to the three pillars of governance; board .748, transparency .602 and internal controls 
.712 .Signs of growth indicated a positive correlation of .239 with the board and 0.1 with the 
internal controls. The positive correlations of the above meant that as the independent variables 
increase in value the dependent variables also increase in value and conversely if there is a 
decrease.  
However, the study showed that protection had a negative correlation of -.296 to the board, -.105 
on transparency and .202 to internal controls; rates of return -.146 to transparency; signs of 
growth - .55 to the transparency respectively. This means that when the independent variables 
increase, the dependent variables decrease and vice versa. 
4.5.2 Regression Analysis 
Regression Analysis was used to examine the effect of corporate governance pillars on a single 
outcome PEARLS ratios variable. This was to examine whether if pillars of governance predicts 
financial soundness of the SACCOs. 
Regression analysis 1: Relationship between protection and board, transparency and internal 
controls 
The first regression equation is that board, transparency and Internal controls have a significant 
positive correlation on the SACCOs financial soundness (protection ratio, P1). The equation is: 











B Std. Error Beta 
1 
(Constant) 493.656 319.578  1.545 .157 
Board Responsibility -2.672 2.208 -.380 -1.210 .257 
Transparency and 
Disclosure 
-.707 3.579 -.063 -.198 .848 
Internal Controls -2.143 2.486 -.284 -.862 .411 
a. Dependent Variable: Protection 
 
R = .420       R-Sq = .177      R-Sq (adj) = -.098   
This regression (1) has the protection ratio (P1) as the dependent variable and board, 
transparency and internal controls as the independent variables. There are negative outputs i.e (-
2.7,-.71 and -2.11) and the result is that as independent variables decreases the dependent 
variable increases. However, the data had p- values of .257, .848 and .411 respectively which 
shows that the data are insignificant for making conclusion on financial soundness of SACCOs 
since the values of significance (p-value) are greater than 5%. The model therefore is statistically 
non-significant. R –sq shows the proportion of variability between the study variables. The 
variability in the protection ratio accounted for by variation in board, transparency and internal 
controls is .177 which is considered as low. This means that board, transparency and internal 
controls alone cannot explain variation in protection ratio. 
This is in line with the findings of Adjaoud et al ( 2007) who examined the relationship between 
firm performance and governance scores and found that the relationship was not significant 
between the scores and the accounting – based measures of performance. 
Regression analysis 2: Relationship between effective financial structure and board, 
transparency and internal controls 
The second regression equation is that board, transparency and Internal controls have a 
significant positive correlation on the SACCOs financial soundness (Effective financial structure 
E1). E1 = the net loans to total assets is the response variable. The equation is: 
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E1 ratio = 95.2 + .52 BO +.67 TD+.11IC 







B Std. Error Beta 
1 
(Constant) 95.224 56.424  1.688 .006 
Board Responsibility .520 .390 .396 -1.333 .021 
Transparency and 
Disclosure 
.668 .632 .319 1.057 .018 
Internal Controls .110 .439 .078 -.251 .007 
a. Dependent Variable: Effective Financial Structure 
R = .897       R-Sq = .805      R-Sq (adj) = .72  P= .405 
The outputs in this equation have positive correlations of .52, .67 and .11.This means that as 
board, transparency and internal controls variables increases the net loans to total assets also 
increases. The results show that the three pillars of governance explain variations in financial 
soundness of SACCOs. The respective p- values (.021, .018, .007) indicate the statistical 
significant of this variables in explaining the financial soundness of the SACCOs. 
Effective financial structure variables affect the growth, profitability and efficiency of the 
SACCOs (Richardson, 2001). Therefore this is in line with Brown & Caylor (2004) findings that 
indicated that better governed firms are relatively more profitable, valuable and pay cash to their 
shareholder. 
Regression analysis 3: Relationship between asset quality and board, transparency and 
internal controls 
The third regression equation is that board, transparency and Internal controls have a significant 
positive correlation on the Asset quality (A1).  











B Std. Error Beta 
1 
(Constant) 373.105 214.317  1.741 .116 
Board Responsibility -4.447 1.481 -.708 -3.003 .015 
Transparency and 
Disclosure 
2.209 2.400 .221 .921 .381 
Internal Controls -2.604 1.667 -.385 -1.562 .153 
a. Dependent Variable: Asset Quality 
 
R = .733       R-Sq = .537      R-Sq (adj) = .383   
 
The results show that the board responsibility explains a variation in asset quality ratios as its 
levels decreases hence more profitability; t-value -3.0 and p- value of 0.015 confirming the 
statistical significance of this variable. This is in line of Lynch (1979), who found an increased 
revenue turnover and profits when board members increased their involvement in strategic 
activities. 
From the results, transparency and disclosure recorded a positive coefficient of 2.2 meaning that 
as transparency and disclosure increases the assets quality ratio too increases, however the t-
value of .92 and a p-value of .381 show that the variable is not statistically significant. This 
contradicts Beeks & Brown (2005) who found that higher corporate governance quality makes 
more informative disclosures. 
Internal controls had negative coefficients of -2.6 and the t- value of -1.5 and a p-value of .15 
and therefore not statistically significant since the calculated p- value is higher than .05level. 
This confirms Ge & Mcvay (2005) findings that firms with material internal control weakness 





Regression analysis 4: Relationship between Rates of return and costs and board, 
transparency and internal controls 
The fourth regression equation is that board, transparency and Internal controls have a significant 
positive correlation on the Rates of return and costs (R9).  
Rates of return ratio =78.5 +1.4 BO -2.9 TD+2.1C 






B Std. Error Beta 
1 
(Constant) 78.533 473.635  .166 .872 
Board Responsibility 1.443 3.272 .148 .441 .670 
Transparency and 
Disclosure 
-2.999 5.304 -.193 -.565 .586 
Internal Controls 2.140 3.684 .204 .581 .576 
a. Dependent Variable: Rates of Return and Costs 
 
R = .258       R-Sq = .066      R-Sq (adj) = .245   
The result shows as the transparency (-2.9) increases the rates of return decrease. The t- value 
and p- value finds that the equation is not statistically significant. 
The board and internal controls had coefficients of 1.4 and 2.1 respectively; meaning that as their 
ratios increase the rates of return also increases. Both variables were not statically significant. 
Again this is in line of of Adjaoud et al (2007) findings who examined the relationship between 
firm performance and governance scores and found that the relationship was not significant 
between the scores and the accounting – based measures of performance. 
Regression analysis 5: Relationship between Liquidity and board, transparency and internal 
controls 
The fifth regression equation is that board, transparency and Internal controls have a significant 
positive correlation on the Liquidity (L1). The regression equation is as follows 
Liquidity ratio =1536.7 +1.6 BO+22.2 TD +.049 IC 
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The   coefficient of the variables are 1.6, 22.2 and 0.049 which are statistically significant with p-
values of .013, .004 and 0.015 respectively meaning corporate governance have direct impact on 
the SACCOs liquidity. This is a confirmation of Brown & Caylor (2004) findings that better 
governed firms are relatively more profitable, valuable and pay cash to their shareholder. Thus 
ensuring the firm is financially sound. 






B Std. Error Beta 
1 
(Constant) 1536.758 944.806  1.627 .008 
Board Responsibility 1.681 6.528 .071 .258 .013 
Transparency and 
Disclosure 
22.339 10.580 .592 2.111 .004 
Internal Controls .049 7.349 .002 -.007 .015 
a. Dependent Variable: Liquidity 
 
R = .893      R-Sq =.797      R-Sq (adj) =.756  
Regression analysis 6: Relationship between Signs of growth and board, transparency and 
internal controls 
The Sixth regression equation is that board, transparency and Internal controls have a significant 
positive correlation on the signs of growth (S11). The regression equation is as follows 













B Std. Error Beta 
1 
(Constant) 1259.765 571.015  2.206 .055 
Board Responsibility -3.985 3.945 -.259 -1.010 .339 
Transparency and 
Disclosure 
16.213 6.395 .662 -2.535 .032 
Internal Controls 4.031 4.442 .244 .908 .388 
a. Dependent Variable: Signs of growth 
R = .67       R-Sq = .45      R-Sq (adj) = .27  
 
The results shows that transparency and disclosure ratios predict changes in signs of growth ratio 
which is indicated by t-value of -2.5 and p- value 0.032 less than 5%.The positive coefficient of 
transparency and disclosure (16.2) indicates that the more  transparency and disclosure the  
SACCOs are, the more they report  high signs of growth . The variables are statistically 
significant at p-value of 0.032.This is in conformity of Habib (2008) findings that transparency 
and disclosure policy is a predictor for the interrelation between corporate governance and firm 
performance 
Board and internal controls were found to be statistically insignificant as indicated by p-values of 
.34 and 0.39 respectively. 
For the board, it contradicts Lynch (1979), who found an increased revenue turnover and profits 
when board members increased their involvement in strategic activities and hence more growth. 
Regression analysis 7: Relationship between financial soundness (PEARLS) and board, 
transparency and internal controls 
The regression below looks how the three variables board, transparency and disclosure and 
internal controls together affects financial soundness (PEARLS ratio) of the SACCOs. The 
regression equation is: 










B Std. Error Beta 
1 
(Constant) 639.545 209.334  3.055 .014 
Board Responsibility 1.417 1.446 .241 .980 .035 
Transparency and 
Disclosure 
6.561 2.344 .701 2.799 .021 
Internal Controls .209 1.628 .033 .128 .040 
a. Dependent Variable: Performance (PEARLS) 
 
Table 4.21: Model Summary 
Model R R Square Adjusted R Square Std. Error of the 
Estimate 
1 .704a .496 .328 36.27168 
a. Predictors: (Constant), Internal Controls, Board Responsibility, Transparency and Disclosure 
 
Table 4.21: ANOVAa 
Model Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
1 
Regression 11636.953 3 3878.984 2.948 .041b 
Residual 11840.716 9 1315.635   
Total 23477.669 12    
a. Dependent Variable: Performance (PEARLS ) 
b. Predictors: (Constant), Internal Controls, Board Responsibility, Transparency and Disclosure 
 
From table 4.20 it can be seen that a unit of board responsibility would lead to an increase in 
financial soundness (PEARLS) of the SACCOs by a factor of 1.4, a unit increase in transparency 
and disclosure would lead to increase in financial soundness of SACCOs by a factor of 6.5 and a 
unit increase in Internal controls lead to an increase by a factor of .21. 
At 5% significant level board, transparency and internal controls had .035, .021 and .040 level of 
significance respectively. Thus all the variables were statistically significant. 
The prediction that board responsibility has positive significant impact on financial soundness is 
supported. The board responsibility coefficient is positive 1.4, t-value =.98 and p- value =.035 
57 
 
showing that the more the board is involved in management of the SACCOs the higher the 
financial soundness (PEARLS) ratios.  
The positive coefficient 6.5 for transparency and disclosure indicate that the relationship with 
financial soundness is statistically significant, t-value 2.8, p-value 0.021.This indicates that as 
more transparency is disclosed in the SACCO a lot of confidence is gained and members 
increase their contributions which improves SACCOs financial soundness. 
The prediction that internal control also has positive significant impact on financial soundness is 
supported with a positive coefficient .21, t-value .13 and p-value .04. This indicates a SACCO 
with sound internal controls has a positive impact on finance performance as it is able to prevent 
against any risk and contains fraud. 
From table 4.21 model summary, adjusted squared which is a coefficient of determination inform 
us the variation in the dependent variable due to changes in the predictor variable, is 49.6 % 
(.496). This indicates there is a variation of 49.6% on financial soundness (PEARLS) of 
SACCOs due to changes in board responsibility, transparency and disclosure and internal 
control. R-.70 shows there is a strong positive relationship between the variables under the study. 
From table 4.22 the ANOVA statistics indicate the model is good for making conclusion on the 
variables as the value of significance is less than 5% (p-value 0.041). 
The findings agree with Beiner & Drobetz (2004) who indicated that improved corporate 
governance is associated with high firm valuation. 
4.6  Summary of Findings 
The study was to examine the relationship between corporate governance and the financial 
soundness of licensed SACCOs. Three of the most vital corporate governance mechanism such 
as board responsibility, transparency and disclosure and internal controls were examined. From 
the respondents i.e. CEOs, senior managers and other senior staff all agreed that three pillars of 
corporate governance have an impact on the financial soundness of the SACCOs. However an 
internal control plays a major role than the other two. 
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From the computed PEARLS ratios which were examined, the findings are that majority are 
within the recommended goals of excellence by WOCCU. 
From the regression analysis, using one dependent variable indicate that board responsibility, 
transparency and disclosure and internal controls do not individually explain variations in 
PEARLS ratios on protection and rates of return and costs. However board, transparency and 
internal control do explain variations on effective financial structure and liquidity.  
From the multiple regressions, high variation of 49.6% financial soundness levels are explained 
by the predictor variables in this study and therefore the model is good in predicting financial 
soundness levels of the SACCOs (See table 4.20 and 4.21). 
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CHAPTER FIVE: SUMMARY , CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
  
5.1 Introduction 
This chapter presents the summary of the findings, conclusion and recommendation of the study. 
5.2 Summary  
The following important conclusions   were made in regards to the objectives of the study. 
 
5.2.1 Governance pillars  
For objective one the study found that internal controls play an important role in SACCOs 
corporate governance: there was a high degree of agreement that it was the most important factor 
in corporate governance. SASRA lays down a number of requirements in relation to Board 
responsibility, Transparency and Disclosure, and internal controls to achieve good corporate 
governance. The requirements that relate to internal controls are the ones that respondent state on 
average to be those most complied with: the SACCO management reports from both internal and 
external auditors were reviewed and actions taken concerning any deviations and weaknesses in 
accounting and operational controls. In addition, the research found that the majority of the 
SACCOs have enough policies and procedures to safeguard against error, carelessness, conflict 
of interest and fraud. It was also observed that most of the SACCOs were cautious in ensuring 
that audited financial statements were submitted within the required time. Thus the SACCOs 
were responsible in ensuring proper records were kept and approvals from the members were 
obtained during annual general meeting.  
Internal controls were prominent in contributing to the financial soundness of the SACCOs 
compared to the other two pillars, namely transparency and disclosure and board responsibility. 
This prominence is because the internal controls concept was broad as it refers to risk 
management and accountability which bring in legitimacy in SACCOs’ management. This gives 
confidence to the members. 
Most of the SACCOs under study reported good profits for the four years and this is in line to the 
findings of Ge & McVay (2005) that firms with material internal control weakness are less 
profitable and vice versa. 
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5.2.2 Regression analysis  
For objective two, the study found that the relationship between the effective financial structure s 
and the liquidity ratios and the pillars of corporate governance to be significant. Effective 
financial structure relates to the growth, efficiency and profitability and hence improves the 
liquidity of the SACCOs. 
This finding confirms Brown & Caylor (2004) findings that better governed firms are relatively 
more profitable, valuable and pay dividends to their shareholder. 
The multiple regressions revealed that a unit of independent variables led to an increase in 
financial soundness of SACCOs and were statistically significant. This is in agreement with the 
Beiner & Drobetz (2004) findings. 
5.3 Conclusion 
From the findings on the effect of the three pillars of governance under study, we established that 
internal controls affect financial soundness of SACCOs more than transparency and disclosure 
and the board responsibility. However, collectively the three pillars affect SACCO’s financial 
soundness. 
From regression analysis protection ratio was found to negatively affect SACCOs financial 
soundness. Effective financial structure and liquidity ratio positively affected SACCOs. However 
from the multiple regression analysis we found that the three pillars of governance are 
statistically significant and therefore influence the financial soundness of SACCOs. 
The study thus concludes that board responsibility, transparency and disclosure and internal 
controls do positively influence the financial soundness of licensed deposit taking SACCOs in 
Kenya. 
5.4 Recommendations 
Results of the study show that there is great need for SACCOs to put more pressure on the 
application of the corporate governance pillars and especially on board responsibility. Ignoring 
the role of the board can jeopardize all the other tenets of corporate governance in the SACCO 
since it is the oversight and strategic body for the institution. The board of directors of SACCOs 
needs to be educated on their role and mandate and especially on the supervisory element. 
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Members of SACCOs should also be educated on how to appoint able members of the board so 
that those appointed are persons who understand the essence of corporate governance, which will 
enhance financial soundness in SACCOs. 
There is great need for SACCOs’ financial soundness to be measured using PEARLS which is an 
international tool. This will help the licensed deposit SACCOs to be competitive globally and 
improve on those ratios which they are not performing well and include the two ratios which are 
not in the CAMEL model. 
5.5 Recommendation for further studies 
The research recommends that a study to determine other factors in addition to corporate 
governance should be carried out so that other factors which may contribute to the financial 
soundness of SACCOs can be discussed. 
A further study would be on financial soundness of SACCOs using PEARLS against CAMEL. 
A further study would be on how other variables like human resource and net – work branches 
which are outside the PEARLS and CAMEL framework affects SACCOs performance. 
5.6 Limitations of the Study 
The study considered a sample of 13 audited financial statements out of 43 SACCOs (30%). This 
might not be representative enough to arrive at a truly conclusive result in examining the 
relationship between corporate governance and the financial soundness of all deposit taking 
SACCOs. Some SACCOs omitted from the sample could have a better or a worse relationship. 
Some SACCOs had not submitted their audited financial statements to SASRA and therefore we 
were not able to access their financial statements. This limitation was caused by lack of follow –
up by SASRA. However, the failure to file the financial statements with SASRA would suggest 
that corporate governance in those SACCOs is weak: but no conclusion can be arrived at with 
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Appendix A: Questionnaire 
             
     Strathmore University 
           
22 October 2014 
Dear Sir/Madam, 
I am a Master of Commerce student in the School of Management and Commerce at Strathmore 
University, Kenya. My study project is on the relationship between corporate governance and 
financial soundness of licensed deposit taking SACCOs. The purpose of this research is to assess 
the effectiveness of the existing corporate governance practices in achieving better finance 
performance by Kenyan SACCOs. 
 I invite your participation in this research by completing the attached questionnaire which will 
take approximately 10-15 minutes. Your cooperation in this regard is highly appreciated. The 
information collected will be treated with utmost confidence and therefore the confidentiality of 
your responses is assured.  














Section A: Background Information 
A1. Name: (Optional) --------------------------------------------------- 
A2. What is the name of your SACCO? ________________________________ 
A3. For how long has this SACCO been in operations in Kenya …………….years? 
A4. What is your Job position? 
Chairman   [ ] 
CEO    [ ]  
Director   [ ] 
Senior Manager  [ ]  
Others (Specify)  [ ]  
A5. How long have you been working with this SACCO? 
0-5 yrs    [ ] 
5-10 yrs   [ ]  
10-15 yrs   [ ] 
Over 15 yrs   [ ]  
Use a scale of 1 to 5 where 1 is Strongly disagree, 2 – Disagree, 3- Hardly agree, 4- Agree  and 5 
– Strongly Agree in regards to the statement about SACCO and finance soundness of SACCOs 
for sections B,C and D. 









B1.Management maintains proper and accurate records showing true and fair position 
of the SACCO’s financial condition 
     
B2. Board ensure that the SACCO functions effectively and an adequate and strong 
internal control system is in place 
     
B3. The board ensures that adequate provisions for known and probable losses likely 
to occur are made 
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B4. The board assist in maintaining a positive image of the SACCO within the 
industry and the economy as a whole by setting key policies affecting stakeholders 
     
B5. The board set up a number of management committees like audit and credit to 
effectively discharge its functions 
     
B6. The board  is responsible for the production of annual audited accounts to be 
presented at annual general meeting held not later than four months after the end of a 
financial year 
     
B7.The Board is involved for the appointment and removal of the chief executive 
officer of the SACCO 
     
B8.The board have established criteria for required expert and professional 
knowledge and experience , as well as other conditions for appointment of the CEO 
     
C.Transparency and disclosure      
C1.Monthly, quarterly and annual financial statements showing current compared to 
last year period actual performance , the budget against the actual expenditure is 
presented to the board 
     
C2.Delinquent loan list , growth in loans, loans losses, recoveries and provisions are 
well disclosed 
     
C3.A comprehensive statement of income ( monthly , quarterly and annual) 
comparing budget and actuals is prepared 
     
C4.Sources and distribution on profile of savings and deposits is disclosed      
C5.All insider dealings and non- performing insiders loans are disclosed      
C6.Reports on the violation of SACCO Act plus other applicable law are prepared 
and remedial actions taken to comply 
     
C7.Big risk exposures, investment portfolio , any regulatory reports ,and internal 
reports which are relevant to the SACCO operations are declared 
     
C8.A Statement showing capital structure and adequacy is prepared      
D .Internal Controls      
D1.The SACCO has established an internal audit function which is responsible for 
reviewing and reporting adequacy of the internal audit system and the financial 
matters 
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D2.The Internal auditor reports to the Audit committee of the board      
D3.The audited financial statements are submitted for approval to the authority 
within three months after the end of the financial year 
     
D4. The audit committee reviews the financial conditions of the SACCO ,internal 
controls, performance and findings of the internal auditors and recommend remedial 
actions at least once in every three months 
     
D5.SACCO have set adequate internal controls  to achieve SACCO financial 
reporting objectives 
     
D6.The SACCO keep the accounting records and financial reports are accurately 
prepared to reflect its operations and results 
     
D7.The SACCO management reports from the internal and external auditors are 
reviewed concerning deviations and weaknesses in accounting and operational 
controls 
     
D8.SACCOs have mechanisms and rules for performing supervision and controls 
established to safeguard against internal control weaknesses  




Appendix B: List of SACCOs 
A.SCHEDULE OF LICENCESED DEPOSIT –TAKING SACCO SOCIETIES 
1 AFYA SACCO SOCIETY LTD 
2 AIRPORT SACCO SCCIETY LTD 
3 ARDHI SACCO SCCIETY LTD 
4 ASILI SACCO SCCIETY LTD 
5 CHAI SACCO SCCIETY LTD 
6 CHUNA SACCO SCCIETY LTD 
7 COMOCO SACCO SCCIETY LTD 
8 ELIMU SACCO SCCIETY LTD 
9 FUNDILIMA SACCO SCCIETY LTD 
10 HARAMBEE SACCO SCCIETY LTD 
11 HAZINA SACCO SCCIETY LTD 
12 JACARANDA SACCO SCCIETY LTD 
13 JAMII SACCO SCCIETY LTD 
14 KENPIPE SACCO SCCIETY LTD 
15 KENVERSITY SACCO SCCIETY LTD 
16 KENYA BANKERS SACCO SCCIETY LTD 
17 KENYA POLICE SACCO SCCIETY LTD 
18 KINGDOM SACCO SCCIETY LTD 
19 MAGEREZA SACCO SCCIETY LTD 
20 MAISHA SACCO SCCIETY LTD 
21 MILIKI SACCO SCCIETY LTD 
22 MWALIMU NATIONAL SACCO SCCIETY LTD 
23 MWITO SACCO SCCIETY LTD 
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24 NACICO SACCO SCCIETY LTD 
25 NAFAKA SACCO SCCIETY LTD 
26 NAKU SACCO SCCIETY LTD 
27 NASSEFU SACCO SCCIETY LTD 
28 NATION SACCO SCCIETY LTD 
29 NEST SACCO SCCIETY LTD 
30 SAFARICOM SACCO SCCIETY LTD 
31 SHERIA SACCO SCCIETY LTD 
32 STIMA SACCO SCCIETY LTD 
33 TELEPOST SACCO SCCIETY LTD 
34 TEMBO SACCO SCCIETY LTD 
35 TRANSCOM SACCO SCCIETY LTD 
36 UFANISIS SACCO SCCIETY LTD 
37 UFUNDI SACCO SCCIETY LTD 
38 UKRISTO NA UFANISI WA ANGLICANAI SACCO SCCIETY LTD 
39 UKULIMA SACCO SCCIETY LTD 
40 UNITED NATION  SACCO SCCIETY LTD 
41 WANANGA  SACCO SCCIETY LTD 
42 WANANDEGE  SACCO SCCIETY LTD 




B. LIST OF SACCOs FOR SECONDARY DATA 
1 AFYA SACCO SOCIETY LTD 
2  AIRPORT SACCO SOCIETY LTD 
3  ASILI SACCO SOCIETY LTD 
4  CHAI SACCO SOCIETY LTD 
5  ELIMU SACCO SOCIETY LTD 
6  HARAMBEE SACCO SOCIETY LTD 
7 KENPIPE SACCO SOCIETY LTD 
8 KENYA BANKERS SACCO SOCIETY LTD 
9 MWALIMU SACCO SOCIETY LTD 
10  NATION SACCO SOCIETY LTD 
11  SAFARICOM SACCO SOCIETY LTD 
12  SHERIA SACCO SOCIETY LTD 





Appendix C: Secondary data for four years on thirteen (13) SACCOs 
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